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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAETANO A. DONATELLI and LAURA 
DONATELLI, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
TROY BEAUMONT and PENHALL 
COMPANY, a California corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
Appellate Case No. 20080020 
District Court Civil No. 050102304 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action is within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(j). The Utah Supreme Court assigned this case to the 
Court of Appeals by the authority of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue, Was the district court correct in ruling that Gaetano A. DonatelH 
("DonatelH") waived any entitlement to prejudgment interest on the amount awarded to 
him by the jury in this matter? Did DonatelH create the condition of which he now 
complains? 
1 
Standard of Review. The appropriateness of a trial court's decision not to award 
prejudgment interest is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Lefavi v. 
Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, % 23, 994 P.2d 817. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44, Personal injury judgments—Interest 
authorized. 
(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries 
sustained by any person, resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any 
other person, corporation, association, or partnership, whether by 
negligence or willful intent of that other person, corporation, association, or 
partnership, and whether that injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, 
the plaintiff in the complaint may claim interest on the special damages 
actually incurred from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to 
the cause of action. 
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that 
action, to add to the amount of special damages actually incurred that are 
assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on that 
amount calculated at the legal rate, as defined in section 15-1-1, from the 
date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to the 
date of entering the judgment, and to include in that judgment. 
(3) As used in this section, "special damages actually incurred" does not 
include damages for future medical expenses, loss of future wages, or loss 
of future earning capacity. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. On May 10, 2001, Troy Beaumont, while driving a Penhall 
Company truck on his way home from work, rear-ended a vehicle driven by Gaetano 
DonatelH, a Wyoming resident, on Redwood Road in Salt Lake City, Utah. At the time 
of the accident, DonatelH had been following another vehicle driven by a family 
member. A third vehicle suddenly pulled out in front of the family member and took off, 
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causing the family member and Donatelli to both slam on their brakes. Beaumont did . 
not have enough time to stop and bumped Donatelli's vehicle at a speed of 4-5 miles per 
hour. The Donatelli vehicle sustained approximately $1,700 worth of minor damage. 
The truck sustained no damage. Donatelli complained of back pain and was transported 
to Jordan Valley Hospital where he was examined, treated with pain medication, and 
released the same day. 
After almost four years, Donatelli sued Beaumont and Beaumont's employer, 
Penhall Company, for injuries sustained as a result of the motor vehicle accident. 
Defendants challenged Donatelli's claimed damages. Donatelli's medical records reflect 
that he had preexisting back problems for which he had received "repeated treatment." 
Over the next few years after the accident, Donatelli received continued to receive 
medical treatment for back problems. The evidence presented to the jury included 
evidence from Donatelli's own medical provider, Dr. Shramek, that he had determined 
that any back injury resulting from the accident had resolved within a few weeks. 
Stephen Marble, M.D., Appellees' expert witness who conducted an IME of Donatelli 
and reviewed his medical records prior to and after the accident, confirmed this 
determination. In fact, Donatelli did not seek treatment for back pain from June, 2001 
until November, 2001. Substantial evidence was presented to the jury, which supported 
the position that the subsequent back pain was related to his ongoing degenerative disk 
disease and not related to the motor vehicle accident in the form of expert testimony and 
the testimony of Donatelli's treating physician. 
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A jury trial was held in April 2007. At the end of trial, Donatelli's counsel 
proposed, and the court accepted, a special verdict form which included question 7: 
What amount of money will fairly and reasonably compensate Gaetano Donatelli for the 
damages he has suffered as a result of the collision as addressed in these instructions? A 
copy of the Interrogatories to Jury and Verdict Form is attached herein as Addendum #1. 
The jury returned a verdict for Donatelli, which included an amount to compensate 
Gaetano Donatelli for the damages he suffered in the amount of $137,543.48. The jury 
came back into the courtroom with a proposed "special verdict" three times. Each time 
the proposed verdict was reviewed by counsel for the parties and each time the jury was 
polled with counsel for Donatelli never objecting to the special verdict or the form of the 
question. 
Course of Proceedings, After the trial was over and the jury was dismissed, 
Donatelli filed a Motion and Application for Prejudgment Interests and Costs on May 4, 
2007. Appellees filed a Memorandum in Opposition on May 18, 2007, objecting to the 
prejudgment interest on the ground that the verdict form, which counsel for Donatelli had 
created submitted and requested, did not distinguish between special and general 
damages and therefore, it would be speculation to award prejudgment interest based on 
the verdict that the jury returned. Appellees also noted that Donatelli had waived any 
right to prejudgment interest because he failed to object to the verdict or the form while 
the jury was still impaneled, thereby creating the condition of which he now complains. 
Donatelli filed a Reply Memorandum. Judge Roth issued his Memorandum Decision and 
Order without oral argument, attached herein as Addendum #2. 
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Disposition. The trial court denied Donatelli's application for prejudgment 
interest in the Memorandum Decision and Order dated July 30 , 2007, on the basis that 
the jury verdict did not ask the jury to distinguish between special (economic) and 
general (non-economic) damages; that the Plaintiff had agreed to this aspect that it is the 
province of the jury and the jury alone to assess damages; and that the time for 
correcting such a situation is before the jury is released. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
When the defense rested in the trial of this matter in April, 2007, the jury was 
presented with instructions regarding economic and non-economic damages. R. 1811-
1813 and R. 2507, 89:2-5, 23-25 and 90:1-91:4. The parties participated in drafting the 
jury instructions and Plaintiffs prepared the jury verdict form, both of which were 
discussed with Judge Roth prior to submission to the jury. R. 1766 - 1818. After the jury 
was sent out three times, it awarded Donatelli $137, 543.48. R. 1767. The jury entered 
the award on the Interrogatories to Jury and Jury Verdict in response to question number 
7. Id. The Interrogatories and Jury Verdict contains no other questions to enable the jury 
to separate the award into economic and non-economic damages. R. 1766-68. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Donatelli created the situation of which he complains. The jury received a special 
verdict form, which Donatelli's counsel had drafted, submitted, requested and argued for. 
The jury instructions and the special verdict form were reviewed in chambers, argued 
about, and finalized before counsel gave their closing arguments. Donatelli's counsel, 
Terry Mackey, referred to the special verdict form in his closing argument. There is no 
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way, other speculation, to distinguish how much of the award the jury intended for 
economic damages and how much of the award was intended for non-economic damages. 
This is especially true given the final composition of the six jurors that agreed on the 
verdict. One final juror had opposed the amount of the proposed award in the polling 
about the two unacceptable versions of the verdict. Donatelli created the condition of 
which he now complains in that he failed to object or correct the verdict form, or ask for 
clarification of the damage award at the time the jury was seated. As a result, Donatelli 
has waived any entitlement to prejudgment interest and the trial court's decision should 
be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DONATELLI WAIVED HIS ENTITLEMENT TO PREJUDMENT 
INTEREST. 
A. Donatelli Has Not Proved His Past Medical Expenses with 
Mathematical Certainty. 
Donatelli argues that he is entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire amount 
awarded by the jury, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44. This statute provides that 
the plaintiff may receive interest on the special damages "actually incurred that are 
assessed by the verdict of the jury." In this case the special verdict did not assess any 
amount as special or economic damages. 
Appellees do not dispute that generally an award of special damages may be 
entitled to prejudgment interest under Utah Code. Ann. § 78-27-44. Appellees offered 
evidence at the trial that not all of Donatelli's claimed expenses were a result of the 
injuries caused by the accident. In this case, the special verdict form does not make any 
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distinction as to whether the award, or how much of the award, may be considered 
special and/or general damages. Therefore, the special damages, on which prejudgment 
interest is awarded, cannot be specifically determined "within a mathematical certainty." 
B. The Trial Court Should Not Speculate As To The Jury's Intentions. 
Donatelli argues that the jury clearly expressed its intentions to award past medical 
specials by writing on the verdict form the exact amount of the medical expenses 
submitted in evidence. To arrive at this conclusion, one must engage in speculation as to 
the jury's intention rather than dealing with the facts as applied to Utah case law. 
First, jury instructions were given regarding the award of both economic and non-
economic damages. R. 1811-1813 and R. 2507, 89:2-5, 23-25 and 90:1-91:4. Plaintiffs 
participated in drafting the jury instructions and prepared the jury verdict form, which 
were submitted to the jury. R. 1766 - 1818. Paragraph 7 of the Interrogatories to Jury 
and Jury Verdict contains only one question pertaining to the award of damages to 
Donatelli: 
What amount of money will fairly and reasonably compensate Gaetano 
Donatelli for the damages he has suffered as a result of the collision, as 
addressed in these instructions? 
$ 
R. 1767 (hereinafter "Paragraph 7"). Clearly, there is no distinction as to whether that 
award is based on special or general damages and Donatelli did not provide the jury an 
opportunity to make that distinction in their award. 
Second, at no time did Donatelli object to the form of Paragraph 7 or to the award 
as not distinguishing between special and general damages while the jury was seated, 
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even though he had ample opportunity to do so. "It is the rule in Utah that a failure to 
object to a verdict, informal or insufficient on its face, before the jury is discharged 
constitutes a waiver of the objection." Balder as v. Starks, 2006 UT App 218, Tf 18, 138 
P.3d 75 (quoting Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Utah 1980) 
(quotations and citations omitted)). When special interrogatories or verdicts of the jury 
are ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to object to filing of verdict or to move 
that they be resubmitted to the jury for clarification. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson 
Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). Thus, requiring 
an objection while the jury is still seated serves the objective of avoiding the expense and 
additional time for a new trial by having the jury, which heard the facts, clarify the 
ambiguity while it is able to do so. Id. Donatelli waived any objection to the lump sum 
verdict by not objecting while the jury was still seated. 
Donatelli is solely responsible for creating the condition of which he now 
complains. Paragraph 7 was specifically discussed with the district court during a final 
review of the jury instructions and verdict form. R. 2507, 44:8 - 45:11. Counsel for 
Donatelli even specifically approved Paragraph 7 during this final review (R. 2507, 
44:13-14) and wrote and approved the entire verdict form. Plaintiffs never objected or 
sought to amend the verdict form during the time the jury was seated, even though the 
jury was sent out three separate times for deliberations. As Judge Roth succinctly stated 
in his memorandum Decision and Order: "It seems the party who invited that award 
should bear the burden associated with it." Memorandum Decision and Order, p.3. 
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The record reflects that the jury returned two unacceptable verdicts before their 
final acceptable verdict. R. 2507, 142:3-143:1; 147:1-168:12; and 168:16-171:25. Each 
time, the same verdict form was used. The parties had their attention called to the 
damages line on each return of the jury yet counsel for Donatelli never asked for a 
correction. The time to correct the verdict was before the jury was dismissed and Judge 
Roth even specifically asked if there was anything more to be done before the jury was 
released. R. 2507, 171:13-15. 
Plaintiffs' counsel argues that it is obvious that the award was the amount of the 
medical expenses and that therefore we can "know" what the jury was thinking. This 
argument breaks down upon review of the jurors' statements about their decision-making 
process when they came back into the courtroom and were on the record. 
When the jury first returned, the special verdict form said "$137,543.48 and their 
attorneys' fees." Six of the jurors were for that verdict and two were against. They (the 
two against) made statements that seemed to indicate that the proposed verdict was too 
large. Plaintiffs' counsel did not ask that a line for special damages be added to the 
special verdict form. Judge Roth told the jury that it could not add attorneys' fees in that 
way and sent the jury back for further deliberations. R. 142:3 - 143:1. 
When the jury returned the second time, the special verdict form said 
"$137,543.48" with no reference to attorneys' fees. When the jury was polled as to their 
verdict they turned out to be 5-2 and 1. Five of the previously agreeing six jurors stood 
by the returned verdict; two remained opposed and one juror that had been with the five 
in the jury room said that she had changed her mind between the jury room and the jury 
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box in the courtroom. She said that she still believed that the Plaintiffs should be 
awarded attorneys fees. Even at this point, Plaintiffs' counsel once again failed to request 
a change in the special verdict form. Judge Roth sent the jury back to continue their 
deliberations with instructions that six of the eight had to agree. R. 147:1-168:12. 
When the jury retuned for the third time, the special verdict form still said 
"$137,543.48"; but there was a change in the jury alignment. The five were still for the 
stated amount; and the single juror that had changed her mind between the jury room and 
the courtroom stood by her position that the verdict was not enough; but one of the two 
jurors that had been opposed to the $137,543.48 changed her vote to favor the completed 
agreed upon amount. (So the jury was now 1-6-1.) R. 168:16-171:25. Judge Roth had 
six jurors that said in open court that they agreed with the verdict. He then asked if there 
was anything further. No one asked for a change to the special verdict form and Judge 
Roth dismissed the jury. R. 2507, 171:13-15. 
Donatelli's counsel had every opportunity to correct the verdict form while the 
jury was seated but failed to do so. The time for the clarification of damages is before the 
jury is released. The trial court reasoned that because it was not clear how much of the 
verdict was intended to compensate Donatelli for his special damages, it would be 
speculation by the trial court to conclude that Donatelli is entitled to prejudgment interest. 
Defendants' position, and the trial court's decision, is best described by the following 
quote: 
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The proper procedure where an informal or insufficient verdict has been 
returned is for the trial court to require the jury to return for further 
deliberation. It is well established by numerous authorities that, when a 
verdict is not in the proper form and the jury is not required to clarify it, 
any error in said verdict is waived by the party relying thereon who at the 
time of its rendition failed to make any request that its informality or 
uncertainty be corrected. 
Langdon v. International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971). R. 2198. In other 
words, as Judge Roth succinctly stated: "Where the error in failing to identify whether the 
damages are special or general was invited by an inadequate verdict form, it seems the 
party who invited that award should bear the burden associated with it." R. 2198. 
While it is difficult to understand why Donatelli's counsel did not speak up when 
she had the opportunity to do so, the Langton court sums up a similar situation: 
The silence of plaintiffs counsel, upon hearing the verdict, is 
comprehensible, he could reasonably have concluded that the jury was 
unsympathetic to his course or parsimonious, and he would, of course, 
prefer a new jury. There must be reasonable rules to control the 
termination of litigation, if counsel has an opportunity to correct error at 
the time of its occurrence and he fails to do so, any objection based 
thereupon is waived. 
Id. at 47. Donatelli failed to identify any irregularity in the verdict form even though he 
had ample opportunity to do so. He is not entitled to prejudgment interest because the 
amount of special damages cannot be determined with mathematical certainty. 
II. THE VERDICT MUST INCLUDE BOTH SPECIAL AND GENERAL 
DAMAGES TO BE VALID, 
As a general rule, it is improper for a jury to award special damages without 
awarding any general damages. Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT App 218, f^ 16, 138 P.3d 75. 
Even if it were apparent that the jury intended that Plaintiff receive only his special 
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damages, it is clear from the case law that the verdict would not be valid, as special 
damages are not allowed unless general damages have been found. Id. The jury was 
clearly instructed, as shown above, regarding both economic and non-economic damages 
so it must be presumed that the jury took both into consideration when awarding damages 
to Donatelli. Unfortunately, Donatelli failed to note a separate line on the verdict form so 
the jury had no choice but to lump both together. There is no way of knowing what the 
jury intended. Either the lump sum includes both economic and non-economic damages 
which cannot be determined and therefore Donatelli is denied prejudgment interest, or the 
judgment, which Appellees already paid, is invalid. It would be speculation to conclude 
that Donatelli is entitled to prejudgment interest on the whole award or any portion 
thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees believe that the trial court ruled correctly in their favor. Plaintiffs failed 
to correct their own verdict form and waived any further right to correct it once the jury 
was dismissed. Donatelli must now bear the burden of that own error because it is not 
within the province of any court to speculate as to what the jury intended when it 
awarded the damage amount. Moreover, even if the jury intended that amount of the 
award to be only special damages, without an award of general damages, the verdict must 
be invalid. Without an amount specifically designated as special damages, prejudgment 
interest is simply not available. 
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Dated this 14th day of July, 2008. 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
Tim Dalton Dunn 
Kathleen M. Liuzzi 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I certify that I served a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellees by U.S. mail, 
first-class, postage pre-paid, on July 14, 2008, to counsel of record as follows: 
Edward P. Moriarity 
Bradley L. Booke 
Jacque M. Ramos 
Terry Mackey 
Moriarity, Badaruddin & Booke 
8 East Broadway, Suite 312 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
b^&stl/rtsM 
Legal Secretary 
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ADDENDUM #1 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
GAETANO A. DONATELLI, LAURA 
DONATELLI 
Plaintiffs), 
vs. 
TROY BEAUMONT and PENHALL 
COMPANY, 
Defendant(s). 
INTERROGATORIES TO JURY 
AND JURY VERDICT 
Civil No. 050102304 
Judge: Stephen L. Roth 
We, the duly-impaneled jury in the above-captioned matter, answer the following 
questions: 
1. Was the defendant Troy Beaumont negligent? 
Yes_ 
No 
/ 
2. Was the negligence of Troy Beaumont a proximate cause of any 
injury(ies) to Gaetano Donatelli? 
Yes / 
No 
0017G6 
FILE© 
THIRD DISTRICT COURl 
APR\p 2007 
WESTJORDAKDEPl 
3. Was the defendant Troy Beaumont acting within the course and scope of 
his employment at the time of the collision? 
Yes ' 
No 
4. Was plaintiff Gaetano Donatelli negligent? 
Yes 
No y 
5. Was the negligence of Gaetano Donatelli a proximate cause of his 
injury(ies)? 
Yes 
No S 
6. What percentage of the "fault" (as defined in the instructions given to you 
by the court) is attributable to defendant Troy Beaumont and what 
percentage is attributable to Plaintiff, Gaetano Donatelli (the percentages 
of fault must total 100%)? 
Troy Beaumont 
Gaetano Donatelli 
Total fault 100% 
7. What amount of money will fairly and reasonably compensate Gaetano 
Donatelli for the damages he has suffered as a result of the collision, as 
addressed in these instructions? 
$ /37f.^4Z^ 4? -h—h^t, LI^UA-L- Kfcfe'g ^ ^ - 7 - ^ T 
8. If you find for Gaetano Donatelli, what amount of money will fairly and 
reasonably compensate Laura Donatelli, as a result of the collision, for her 
loss of consortium, as addressed in these instructions? 
$ -0~ 
Dated this £1 day of N /WUU, 2007. 
Jury Foreperson 
001768 
ADDENDUM #2 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
GAETANO A. DONATELLI and LAURA 
DONATELLI, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Plaintiff : 
vs. : CaseNo.:050102304 
PENHALL COMPANY, a California Judge STEPHEN L. ROTH 
Corporation, and TROY BEAUMONT, 
Individually, 
Defendant 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion and Application for Prejudgment Interest 
and Entry of Judgment. Having considered the briefing submitted by the parties, the Court enters the 
following decision: 
This matter was tried before a jury April 25-April 27, 2007. In addition to other damages 
evidence, the Plaintiffs provided the jury with evidence of $137,543.48 in medical expenses. Finding 
Defendant Beaumont ("Defendant") 100% liable for Gaetano Donatelli's injuries, the jury returned an 
award for Plaintiffs for exactly $137,543.48. The jury did not award Gaetano's wife, Laura any award 
for loss of consortium. Following questions as to whether both parties were negligent, the 
Interrogatories to Juiy and Jury Verdict simply asks "What amount of money will fairly and reasonably 
compensate Gaetano Donatelli for the damages he has suffered as a result of the collision as addressed 
002136 
DONATELLI v. BEAUMONT Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
jury and conclude that 100 per cent of the damages assessed are economic damages for which the pre-
judgment interest rule applies, there are two reasons to resist the urge to do so. 
First, where a jury has been requested, and trial by jury has been conducted, it is the province 
of the jury, and of the jury alone to assess damages. While there is room in the rules of procedure for 
a timely clarification as to the type of damages the jury intended to award, the time for receiving that 
clarification is before the jury is released. InLangton v. International Transport, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 
491 P.2d 1211, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The proper procedure where an informal or insufficient verdict has been 
returned is for the trial court to require the jury to return for further 
deliberation. It is well established by numerous authorities that, when a 
verdict is not in the proper form and the jury is not required to clarify it, 
any error in said verdict is waived by the party relying thereon who at the 
time of its rendition failed to make any request that its informality or 
uncertainty be corrected. 
Id. at 456 (quoting Brown v. Regan, 10 Cal.2d 519, 75 P.2d 1063,1065-1066, citations and alterations 
omitted). In this case, where the error in failing to identify whether the damages are special or general 
was invited by an inadequate verdict form, it seems the party who invited that award should bear the 
burden associated with it. 
Second, even if it were apparent that the jury intended that Plaintiff receive his economic 
damages, and only his economic damages, it is clear from the case law that in fact, the verdict would 
not be valid, as special damages are not allowed unless general damages have been found. See id. The 
claim, therefore, that the award is entirely for special damages cannot be affirmed. Because the Court 
cannot agree with the Plaintiff that pre-judgment interest should be awarded on the entire amount, and 
it is not clear how much of the verdict was intended to compensate Plaintiff for his special damages, it 
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